Out-of-bounds writes in BMP RLE and TIFF strip decoding
JuicyPixels contains independent out-of-bounds writes reachable from
ordinary image decoding (Codec.Picture.decodeImage and the
format-specific decoders):
- BMP
BI_RLE8/BI_RLE4(Codec.Picture.Bitmap.decodeImageY8RLE): the pixel buffer size is computed with 32-bitInt32arithmetic and wraps to a zero-length allocation for large headers; end-of-line and vertical-delta control codes move the destination cursor without a bound, and the horizontal delta jump is unclamped. Every run writes attacker-chosen bytes throughM.unsafeWriteat the cursor position — negative offsets before the raster, arbitrary offsets against a wrapped allocation, and up to 255 bytes past it. - TIFF uncompressed/PackBits contiguous strips
(
Codec.Picture.Tiff.gatherStrips,copyByteString,unpackPackBit): strip copies have no destination bound and the per-strip size computation wraps negative for strips starting past the raster, so excess strips copy attacker-chosen bytes past the end of the allocated raster.
Impact: heap memory adjacent to the decoded image is corrupted with
attacker-selected values and offsets through maliciously crafted BMP or
TIFF files. Beyond corruption, exploitation primitives were demonstrated
end-to-end on GHC 9.6 / linux-amd64: a crafted BMP deterministically
crashed the process via the wrapped allocation; against a warp-based
service a single uploaded BMP overwrote another request's in-memory
session blob, observed in the victim's own HTTP response (12 of 12
cycles); and with heap grooming the write primitive was used to redirect
a lazily-evaluated top-level String passed to
callCommand, executing attacker-supplied commands (3 of 3
runs). These are relative-offset primitives: the demonstrated RCE
depends on heap layout and linkage and is not a guaranteed
arbitrary-address write.
The fix, released in 3.3.10, validates the declared pixel count
centrally in decodeBitmapWithPaletteAndMetadata (cap 2^29
pixels, i.e. 2 GiB of RGBA8), computes all decoder buffer sizes in exact
64-bit Int arithmetic, clips out-of-bounds BMP RLE writes
to the raster (zero-filling skipped pixels, matching the clipping
behaviour of the non-RLE decoders and the Windows WIC decoder), bounds
TIFF strip copies at the destination buffer, and clamps strip counts at
the raster boundary. Malformed-but-decodable files keep decoding instead
of failing.
Residual risk in 3.3.10: the shared GIF/TIFF LZW decoder
(Codec.Picture.Gif.Internal.LZW) retains an unguarded
single-byte KwKwK write reachable from the same TIFF/GIF decode paths;
it is documented as a follow-up and is not addressed by this
release.
Credit: external vulnerability report by Akash Sebastian (@akashseb) and Tomer Fichman (irregular).
Info
- Published
- November 17, 2026
- Modified
- November 17, 2026
- CAPECs
- < none >
- CWEs
- 787
- Keywords
- bmp, tiff, rle, image-decoding, oob-write, rce
- Aliases
- < none >
- Related
- < none >
- References
- [FIX] https://github.com/haskell-github-trust/Juicy.Pixels/commit/9c9a3d75ed0a998b5bfd49534a364a9e52e74ba2
Affected
@hackage/JuicyPixels
- CVSS
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- Versions
>=3.1.3 && <3.3.10- Declarations
- < none >
- Affected APIs
- < none >